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This paper concerns what might be called the variably bad behavior ofthe word or. 
As is well known, there are a variety of environments in which the word or 
misbehaves - misbehaves, in the sense that it gives rise to interpretations which are 
not expected given the standard analysis of this word as, roughly, set union. One of 
these environments is the scope of a modaL This case has received a lot of attention 
recently in the literature, and a number of researchers, including myself, have 
proposed accounts of or which explain its behavior in this environment. 
But here is where the problem arises: When we embed or under both a modal 
and negation, it stops misbehaving and starts acting again like a well behaved 
Boolean operator. This is problematic for those of us who have gone to some lengths 
to argue, on the basis of the affirmative cases, that or isn't  a Boolean operator at all. 
In this paper, I will offer an explanation for this variable misbehavior. I will 
propose that or is, after all, more or less a Boolean operator, although one which 
works in a somewhat special way. In addition, I will argue that or coordinations are 
subject to a special constraint, called Symmetry; and that it is the requirement to 
satisfy Symmetry which sometimes forces or to display apparently non-Boolean 
behavior. 
1. Modais, Negation, and or 
We begin with sentences in which a phrasal or coordination is embedded under a 
modal and negation, as in sentences ( 1)-(2). 
( 1 )  Jane may not sing or  dance. 
(2) Jane must not sing or dance. 
Let's  begin by investigating the may sentence in ( 1 ) ;  we'll come back to the must 
sentence afterwards. 
Sentence ( 1 )  has two possible readings, which are represented using standard 
logical notation in (3)-(4). 
(3) �OGane sing) /\ �OGane dance) "neither reading" 
(4) �OGane sing) V �OGane dance) "disjunctive reading" 
On the neither reading sentence ( 1 )  means that both activities are forbidden for Jane. 
On the disjunctive reading, the sentence means that at least one of the activities is 
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forbidden. The neither reading is generally most salient. But the disjunctive reading 
can be brought out by appending to sentence one the continuation, " . . .  but I don't 
know which." 
The neither reading is the easy case. This is the reading derivable by standard 
treatments of or, of which Partee and Rooth's  ( 1983) Generalized Disjunction 
account is representative. According to this account, an or coordination denotes the 
Boolean join (set union) of its disjuncts. So, assuming that sentence ( 1 )  has an LF 
with the structure shown in (5), its translation proceeds as shown in (6), with the final 
result having the truth conditions (at world w*) shown in (7). 
(5) not [ may [ jane [sing or dance] ] ]  
(6) (i) sing or dance ==> AV.Sing(v) V dance(v) 
(ii) jane sing or dance > sing(j) V dance(j) 
(iii) not [ may [ jane [sing or dance] ] ] ==> � may(sing(j) V dance(j)) 
(7) �3W'EACCw': W'E {w:jane sings at w} u {w:jane dances at w} 
i .e .  iff there is no permissible world in which Jane sings or dances. ! 
These truth conditions are indeed those of the neither reading of ( 1 ). 
The problem is that these are the only truth conditions predicted for sentence 
( 1 ). The Generalized Disjunction strategy alone cannot derive the truth conditions of 
the disjunctive reading, without the help of some complex syntactic assumptions. 
1. 1 .  A Solution: or Coordinations as Sets 
We can account for the ambiguity of (1)  without positing either lexical or structural 
ambiguity, if we adopt an analysis of or coordinations which allows semantic 
composition to proceed in more than one way. In an earlier paper (Simons 2005), I 
proposed that an or coordination denotes a set whose members are the denotations 
of the (ordinary) denotations ofthe disjuncts. (Cf. related proposals in Winter 1 995, 
2000, and Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002.) So, for example, the coordination sing or 
dance denotes the set in (8). 
(8) { [sing], [dance]} 
Now, once we admit such objects as denotations, the question immediately arises: 
how do such denotations combine with the denotations of other expressions? The 
answer is given by the Rule of Independent Composition, whose effects are 
represented schematically in (9) : 
(9) A. = {a(c), b(c)} 
/ \ 
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Here is the general idea: Let A be a node with daughters C and B. Let C have an 
ordinary denotation of type c, while B is a disjunctive expression denoting a set of 
objects each of which is of type <c,a>. Then A also denotes a set, whose members 
are the result of combining each of the members ofthe denotation ofB independently 
with the denotation of C. The formal version of the rule is given in ( 1 0) :  
( 1 0) Rule of Independent Composition 
(i) Let a be a branching node with daughters � and y, where [� ]ED<b a> and 
[y]s:Db' Then [a]  = {a:3gE[y ].[�](g)=a} . 
. 
(ii) Let a be a branching node with daughters � and y, where [�]�D<b.a> and 
[y ]EDb. Then [a]  = {a:3bE[�].[y](b)=a} . 
(Cf. Hamblin 1973, Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002, Winter 1995) 
With these assumptions in hand, it is quite straightforward to derive the disjunctive 
reading of sentence ( 1 ). I repeat the sentence here, with its presumed LF: 
( 1 )  Jane may not sing or  dance. 
not [ may [ jane [sing or dance] ] ]  
The expression sing or dance, by assumption, has the denotation shown in (8) above. 
Now this must combine with the subject, Jane. The result of independent 
composition is the set shown in ( 1 1) .  
( 1 1 )  Wane sing], [jane dance]} 
This set now combines with the modal, also by independent composition, giving: 
( 12) ( [may](Uane sing]), [may]([jane dance])} 
And finally, this set combines with negation by independent composition, giving: 
( 1 3) ([not] [mayJ([jane sing)), [not][mayJ([jane dance])} 
i.e. a set whose members are the proposition that Jane may not sing and the 
proposition that Jane may not dance. 
Now, the final question to be answered is: what do we do at the top of the 
tree? How do we convert a set of denotations into an ordinary sentence denotation? 
The answer I give here departs from my earlier proposal. The new proposal is simple: 
allow that a set originally introduced by or can be simplified at any point via set 
union.2 In this case, the application of union to the set at the top of the tree results in 
a set of possible worlds : all those worlds at which Jane does not sing and all those 
worlds at which Jane does not dance i .e. just the proposition denoted by sentence ( 1 )  
on its disjunctive reading. 
To summarize, then, here is the proposal as to how or coordinations are 
interpreted: the coordination itself denotes a set whose members are the denotations 
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of the disjuncts . This set composes with a sister node in one of two ways. The first 
way is through application of the Rule of Independent Composition. The second way 
is to first apply union to the set, and then proceed with composition in the usual way. 
(Again, the parallel with Winter's (1 995) proposal regarding and coordination should 
be noted.) In the example just considered, set union was applied at the very end of 
the derivation, to convert a complex set denotation into an ordinary proposition. I 
will refer to this analysis of or coordination as the Set Formation analysis. 
Before proceeding, we should go back and check that the neither reading of 
sentence ( 1 ), which we derived earlier using Generalized Disjunction, is also 
derivable in the Set Formation analysis. In fact it is. We proceed in just the same 
way, but apply the union option at the VP level. Here is how the derivation proceeds. 
For convenience, I again repeat here the sentence with its presumed LF. 
( 1 )  Jane may not sing or dance. 
not [ may [ jane [sing or dance] ] ]  
(i) sing or dance ==> { [sing], [dance]} 
(ii) jane sing or dance => {[jane sing], [jane dance]}  (by Independent 
composition) 
(iii) APPL Y UNION ==> U {[jane sing], [jane dance]} 
(iv) mayUane [sing or dance)) ==> [may]u {[jane sing], [j ane dance]} (by 
ordinary composition) 
(v) not [ may [jane [sing or dance] ] ] => 
[not](mayJu {Uane sing], [jane dance)} (by 
ordinary composition) 
Line (v) gives us exactly the truth conditions we expect: 
( 14) �3WEACCw' s.t. WE {W' : jane sings at w' } u  {w': jane dances at w ' }  
1.2. Resultsfor the must Case 
So far, we have shown that both of the readings of sentence ( 1 )  can be derived with 
the Set Formation analysis. We should now go back to the must sentence, and see that 
its readings are also derivable . Here again is the must sentence, with its presumed LF : 
(2) Jane must not sing or dance. 
LF: must [not [jane[sing or dance)]]3 
Like the may version of this sentence, sentence (2) has two interpretations. It too has 
a disjunctive reading, which is made salient by appending " . . .  but I don't  know 
which". On this reading, the sentence has the truth conditions represented in ( 1 5) .  
( 1 5) D�Uane sing) V D�Uane dance) 
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This reading can easily be derived by the strategy outlined above. In fact, we derive 
it in just the same way as we derived the disjunctive reading ofthe may sentence: we 
apply Independent Composition all the way up the tree, then apply the union 
operation at the top to convert the final pair of propositions into a single proposition. 
But for the second reading of the sentence, things are a little more 
complicated. The second reading of the sentence, because of the reversal of scope 
between the modal and negation (see note 3), is the same as the neither reading of 
sentence ( I ), i .e .  has the truth conditions represented in (16) .  
( 1 6) O�(jane sing) /\ O�(jane dance) 
So, let's work through a derivation to try to get this reading. Here is our first attempt. 
( 1 7) Composition strategy #1 
(i) sing or dance => {[sing],[dance]} 
(ii) jane sing or dance ==>Ind. compo {[jane sing),[jane dance]} 
(iii) not jane sing or dance =>Ind comp {[jane singr, [jane dance]-} 4 
(iv) APPLY UNION => u {[jane singr, [jane dancej-} 
(v) must not jane sing or dance ==>standard composition [must](Us)-u[jdr) 
Line (v) gives us the following truth conditions (for a world w*): 
( 1 8) ACCw' � {w: jane does not sing in w or jane does not dance in w} 
But wait ! We were trying to derive the neither reading of sentence (2). But the truth 
conditions derived are not those of the neither reading, nor of any reading available 
for this sentences. 
Now, it turns out that there is a second composition strategy available, which 
does give us the right results . If we apply union earlier - after composition of the 
subject, as we did in deriving the neither reading of sentence ( I )  - we do get the 
correct results, as shown in ( 1 9) .  
( 1 9) Composition strategy #2: 
(i) sing or dance => { [sing),[dance]}  
(ii) jane sing or dance ==>Ind comp {[jane sing),[jane dance]} 
(iii) APPLY UNION => U {[jane sing),[jane dance]}  
(iv) not jane sing or dance =>standard composition ([js)u[jd]r 
(V) must not jane sing or dance =>standard composition [must]«[js]u[jd))-) 
The resulting proposition has the following truth conditions at w* :  
(20) ACCw' >: {w: jane does not sing or dance in w} 
exactly as desired. So, here 's where we stand: We can derive both ofthe readings of 
sentence (2) under the Set Formation analysis. But there is another non-existent 
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reading which also seems derivable. We still need an explanation for why this 
reading does not in fact arise. This, we will come back to later. 
1.3. Coordination as SetFormation:Discussion of Parallels with Winter (J 995/2000) 
Before moving on to some further data, I would like to pause briefly to consider the 
ramifications of the parallel, noted above, between my account of or and Winter' s  
treatment of  and. Winter ( 1 995) argues that an  and coordination introduces a tuple, 
whose members correspond to the conjuncts. These tuples can then compose in two 
ways with their arguments : either by what Winter calls pointwise composition 
(identical in all relevant respects to my Rule of Independent Composition); or else 
the tuple can be simplified via set intersection. 
In Winter (2000), this strategy is also extended to certain special cases of or 
coordination. But Winter ( 1 995) argues that and coordination is fundamentally 
different from or coordination: he claims that the former is syncategorematic ,  and the 
latter categorematic .  Thus, he argues, the two should not receive parallel treatments. 
Winter adduces two kinds of evidence for this position. First, he offers cross­
linguistic evidence that while conjunction is often morphologically null, disjunction 
is never so. Second, he claims that disjunction, unlike conjunction, does not show 
what he calls "structure sensitivity" . Let's take each of these claims in turn . 
While Winter' s  cross-linguistic evidence is initially compelling, some facts 
of English suggest that the situation may be more complicated than he suggests. 
Consider utterances such as (2 1 )  and (22). 
(2 1 )  Don 't poke the cat, she ' ll scratch you. 
(22) You need to bring an umbrella, you're going to get soaked. 
There is no overt connective here. If we were to add one, it certainly would not be 
and. The addition of or, on the other hand, would preserve the intended sense. Now, 
I would not want to argue that there is an implicit or here. One might equally argue 
for the presence of an implicit conditional, with the second clause in each case 
constituting the consequent of an implied antecedent. But certainly, the second clause 
has to be understood as representing the alternative to fulfilment of the requirement 
presented in the first. So there is something very "disjunctive" about such utterances. 
This suggests to me that disjunctive meaning can be expressed in the absence of an 
overt disjunctive morpheme. 
We tum now to Winter's  second point, and his notion of structure sensitivity, 
which is best illustrated by his own examples involving the adverbs alternately and 
respectively: 
(23) John was alternately hot and cold. 
(24) Mary and Sue are tall and short, respectively. 
In support of his analysis of and, Winter points but that for such sentences, the 
interpretation procedure has to have access to each conjunct "independently". Access 
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to their Boolean meet does not suffice. Winter claims further that structure sensitive 
adverbials such as these are not licensed by or, and from this concludes that the 
denotations. of the disjuncts of an or coordination are not independently retrievable 
in the process of interpretation. 
One challenge to this claim comes from Eggert (2000), who demonstrates that 
respectively is acceptable with or coordinations in certain environments. Here are 
two of his examples (all of which are culled from web searches): 
(25) In most carbon compounds, an adjacent atom will contribute one to three 
electrons, which are matched by an equal number from carbon to form a 
single ,  double or triple bond, respectively. 
(26) Choose the snowflake or sun for winter or summer infonnation, respectively. 
Moreover, there is a robust intuition that a variety of cases which are problematic for 
the Boolean treatment of or are problematic precisely because the interpretation 
indeed does seem to look "inside" the disjunction, at the disjuncts themselves. 
Consider for example the case of conditionals with disjunctive antecedents, as 
illustrated in (27). 
(27) If Jane is singing or dancing, then so is Jennifer. 
= If Jane is singing, then Jennifer is singing, and if Jane is dancing, then 
Jennifer is dancing.6 
More pertinently, the case of free choice disjunction, to which we will turn 
immediately below, also seems to demonstrate exactly this property of "structure 
sensitivity," with the interpretation requiring that the modal in some sense have 
access to each disjunct independently. 
I conclude, then, that there are no grounds to dismiss the set-formation 
analysis of or coordinations. Rather, the emergence of an analysis of or parallel to 
Winter's  set-formation analysis of and provides grounds to pursue the possibility of 
a unified analysis of coordination as set formation. 
2. Modals and or Without Negation 
2. 1.  The Problem o/Free Choice Permission Sentences 
Consider sentence (28): 
(28) Jane may sing or dance. 
This sentence, like the others considered so far, has two interpretations. These are 
represented below: 
(29) OGane sing) 1\ OGane dance) "free choice reading" 
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(30) O(jane sing) V O(jane dance) "disjunctive reading" 
Sentences like (28) pose a central problem for any Boolean analysis of or. For while 
the disjunctive reading is straightforwardly derivable, the (generally more salient) 
free choice reading is not derivable on any account based on set union. This includes 
the account proposed here: under the Set Formation analysis, only the disjunctive 
truth conditions of (28) are derivable. 
In the recent literature, a variety of proposals have been offered, aimed at 
solving the free choice problem. All of these proposals involve a departure from the 
Boolean analysis of or. Zimmermann (2000) proposes a modal analysis of 
disjunction. On his account, an or coordination 'A or B '  has the semantics 
' OA&OB' .  Aloni (2002) offers instead a semantics based on alternatives; her 
solution to the free choice problem involves a new semantics for modals which is 
sensitive to the alternative sets generated by their argument. In Simons (2005), I 
argued for or as a set formation operator, and then proposed further that the 
semantics of or also requires that this set serve to "divide up" a given domain. 
All of these accounts take the free choice permission sentence as the central 
case to be explained, and all succeed in deriving its truth conditions.7 But the 
accounts also share the same problem: negation.8 The problem comes down to this. 
Any account which directly assigns to (28) above the truth conditions in (29) will, 
unless some ad hoc modification is made, assign to the negation of (28) the negation 
of (29), i .e. (3 1) :  
(3 1 )  �[O(jane sing) 1\ O(jane dance)]= 
�O(jane sing) V �O(jane dance) 
i .e. Either Jane is not permitted to sing or Jane is not permitted to dance. 
But, as we have already observed, this is only one of the readings ofthe negation of 
(28), and not the most salient reading either. So here is the dilemma: Accounts which 
allow for the derivation of the free choice reading of sentences like (28) don't  get the 
right readings for the negated cases; but a Boolean analysis, which does get the right 
readings for the negated cases, cannot derive the free choice readings.  
This is the dilemma which I now propose to resolve. 
2.2. Disjunction and Symmetry 
In my earlier paper on this topic (Simons 2005) I proposed, as noted above, that the 
truth conditions of a sentence containing an or coordination impose a special 
requirement on the set which the coordination introduces.9 The set must serve to non­
vacuously divide up some domain, with the relevant domain determined by the 
semantic environment in which the coordination occurs. This analysis was a way of 
expressing a more basic idea: that in the interpretation of a disjunction, each disjunct 
is required to make its own independent contribution to the truth conditions of the 
sentence in which it occurs . 1 O  No disjunct can be vacuous; each must impact 
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somehow on the interpretation. We see effects of this sort even looking at 
unembedded clausal disjunctions, which are subject to certain acceptability 
requirements. For example, a disjunction like (32), in which one disjunct entails 
another, is generally unacceptable. 
(32) Either she wore a dress or she wore a red dress. 
This is understandable in terms of a requirement that each disjunct have some 
independent effect on the truth conditions. 
There is a further element to this idea about the basic workings of or. Not 
only must each disjunct make some contribution to the truth conditions; but each 
must make the same kind of contribution. In other words, there is some kind of 
symmetry requirement involved in the interpretation of an or coordination. 
Rather than trying to incorporate this requirement into the truth conditions, 
as I did before, I will here formulate a separate condition which expresses this basic 
idea. I call it the Symmetry Condition, for obvious reasons: 
(33) The Symmetry Condition 
Let A be the maximal alternatives set generated by a disjunction dl or . . .  or 
dn. Under normal conversational circumstances, the disjunction is 
conversationally licensed only ifthere is some salient property P such that for 
all aEA, Pea). 
(The maximal alternatives set generated by a disjunction is the set to which union is 
applied in the course of the derivation i.e. the set resulting from the final application, 
if any, of fudependent Composition.) 
In what follows, I will demonstrate that the truth conditions of modal/neg/or 
sentences derivable via the Set Formation analysis straightforwardly provide a 
property by virtue of which the Symmetry condition can be met. But the truth 
conditions straightforwardly derivable formodallor sentences without negation don't 
provide such a property. The free choice interpretations of these sentences, I will 
argue, are non-compositional strengthenings assigned to these sentences to guarantee 
satisfaction of Symmetry. 
3. Working out the Details 
3. 1 .  How modal/neg/or Interactions Satisfy Symmetry 
Consider again sentence ( 1 ) :  
( 1 )  Jane may not sing or dance. 
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On its neither reading, the sentence has the truth conditions shown in (34). These 
truth conditions can equivalently be expressed as in (35). 
(34) �3WEACCw':  wE[js]u[jd] 
(35) ACCw.n[jsj=12l and ACCw.n[jdJ=12l 
This refonnulation shows that these truth conditions impose a parallel condition on 
each disjunct: each must have an empty intersection with ACCw" the set of 
deontically accessible worlds. This condition makes salient a property which is 
symmetrically satisfied by the disjuncts, namely, the property of non-overlap with 
ACCw'. Thus, the truth conditions themselves provide a property which allows for 
the satisfaction of Symmetry. 
As you will recall, sentence (2), on its most salient reading, shares the truth 
conditions of the neither reading of ( 1 ) .  
(2) Jane must not sing or dance. 
So for one reading of this sentence too, Symmetry is straightforwardly satisfied. 
You will also recall, though, that sentence (2) gave rise to a problem (see 
discussion at end of section 1 .2.). The Set Fonnation analysis seemed to allow for the 
derivation of the unattested truth conditions in (36). 
(36) ACCw' � [-js]u[-jd] 
We have not yet explained how the derivation resulting in these truth conditions is 
ruled out. 
One possibility is that the derivation is ruled out by virtue of considerations 
of Symmetry. Note that the truth conditions in (36) do not provide a property which 
necessarily holds symmetrically of the disjuncts. They could be satisfied, for 
example, in the following situation: 
(37) ACCw' � [-js] & ACCw.n[-jd]=I2l .  
So, i t  is possible that the derivation which results i n  the truth conditions i n  (36) is 
ruled out given the availability of an alternative derivation which results in truth 
conditions which allow for the satisfaction of Symmetry. 
3.2. Strengthening affirmative cases to satisfy Symmetry 
We turn now to the problematic free choice case, as represented by sentence (28). 
(28) Jane may sing or dance. 
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Under the Set Formation analysis, only one set of truth conditions is derivable for this  
sentence. These are the disjunctive truth conditions, represented in (38). 
(38) ACCw' n mane sing)u[jane dance)) " 0  
However, these truth conditions are derivable i n  two different ways; and the 
composition strategy used makes a difference, because each gives rise to a distinct 
maximal alternatives set. Here, I want to focus on just one of the possibilities, the one 
in which we apply union at the VP level, before composing the modal with its 
argument. (We return to the other case below.) In the case under consideration, the 
maximal alternatives set will be: 
(39) {[jane sing),[jane dance]} 
Now, observe that the truth conditions in (38) fail to provide a property to satisfy 
Symmetry with respect to the alternatives in (39). Moreover, as we'll see below, the 
alternative composition strategy also does not straightforwardly satisfy Symmetry. 
So what is the way out? 
I propose that when all else fails, the interpretation procedure moves to 
strengthen the compositionally derivable truth conditions in order to force 
satisfaction of Symmetry. We start with a property which is made salient by the truth 
conditions: the property of non-empty intersection with ACCw'. We then assign to 
(28) strengthened truth conditions in which this property is symmetrically assigned 
to both alternatives, i.e. : 
These are exactly the truth conditions ofthe free choice interpretation. Note, by the 
way, that this account of how the free choice interpretation arises accounts for the 
fact that the non-Boolean interpretation entails the Boolean interpretation: it is a 
strengthening of it. 
Let's now turn to the interaction of must and or, as exemplified in sentence 
(4 1 ) :  
(4 1 )  Jane must sing or dance. 
This sentence also has two possible readings. We focus first on the free choice 
readingl2, under which the sentence has the truth conditions represented in (42): 
(42) ACCw' � ([js)u[jdJ) & ACCw.n[jsj " 0  & ACCw.n[jd) " 0  
Paraphrase: Jane has an obligation which i s  satisfied either b y  singing o r  by 
dancing. 
As with the may/or sentence, the truth conditions derivable for the sentence under the 
Set Formation analysis are weaker than those attested In fact, the derivable truth 
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condition consists of just the first conjunct of (42). The derivation, assuming the LF 
in (43), is shown in (44). 
(43) LF: [must [jane [sing or dance]] ]  
(44) (i) sing or dance => ( [sing),[ dance n 
(ii)jane sing or dance ==>Ind comp ([jane sing), [jane dance]} 
(iii) APPLY UNION ==> U Wane sing], [jane dance]} 
(iv) must jane sing or dance => [mustJ(u ( [jane sing], [jane dance]})  
So now we must explain how the observed truth conditions are arrived at. 
As a first step, note that the derivable truth conditions do not provide any 
property to satisfy Symmetry. The actual truth conditions, though, clearly do impose 
a condition symmetrically on the two members of the maximal alternatives set. So, 
as before, I presume that the observed truth conditions are derived from the initially 
derivable truth conditions via strengthening. 
However, a question arises . The truth conditions initially derivable for (41 )  
- the first conjunct o f  (42) - would seem to make salient the property o f  being a 
superset of ACCw" not that of having a non-empty intersection with ACCw'. 
Wouldn't we then expect the truth conditions to be strengthened to (45), rather than 
to (42)? 
In answer, I think I must say that the derivable truth conditions simply make salient 
some set of possible relations between sets of worlds. The interpretation procedure 
then seeks the weakest strengthening, utilizing some such relation, which will satisfy 
Symmetry. It is also plausible that the procedure avoids strengthenings which would 
make the utterance truth conditionally identical to a competing form. Note that the 
truth conditions in (45) are straightforwardly derivable for sentence (46), with and. 
(46) Jane must sing and dance. 
Hence, assignment of these truth conditions to (4 1 )  would be dispreferred. 
Having introduced the option of strengthening, we need to return one last 
time to the must/neg/or composition puzzle. The puzzle concerned sentence (2), 
repeated here from above. 
(2) Jane must not sing or dance. 
We observed that there is a composition strategy apparently available for this 
sentence (see ( 1 7) above) which would give rise to the unattested truth conditions in 
(47). 
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(47) ACCw.r;; [--jsJu [�d] 
"Jane must either not sing or not dance." 
Earlier, I argued that this strategy, and hence this interpretation, is ruled out because 
the truth conditions in (47) provide no property which would serve to satisfy 
Symmetry. However, now that we've introduced the option of strengthening, it seems 
we should be able to use that strategy here too. So, we could strengthen (47) to (48): 
(48) ACCw.�[--jsJu[�d] & ACCw.n[�s] " 0  & ACCw.n[--jdj " 0 
"Jane is obliged to not sing or not dance; not singing and not dancing are both 
permissible." 
But this is not a reading of (2) either. So we are left with this question: Why can't  we 
use strengthening to remedy the failure of Symmetry in this case? 
Various possible answers suggest themselves. One is that the adoption of an 
alternative composition strategy is preferable to use of the strengthening, which 
should be seen as a last resort. However, at this point I must concede that it is  
possible that the derivation which results in (47) may be ruled out for independent 
reasons. 
3.3. Disjunctive readings, Symmetry, and the Genuineness constraint 
So far, in discussing whether or not readings satisfy Symmetry, we have considered 
only non-disjunctive readings. As soon as we turn to disjunctive readings, we seem 
to encounter a problem, for surely all such readings fail to provide a property which 
will satisfy Symmetry. Consider a simple clausal disjunction: 
(49) Jane sang or Harriet danced. 
This is true at a world w* just in case: 
(50) w*EuWs),lhd )} 
i.e. just in case w* is a member of one disjunct or the other. The truth conditions 
provide no property which is required to hold symmetrically of the two disjuncts. 
But there is a non-truth-conditional property which can serve this role. As 
Zimmermann (2000) notes, each disjunct of an unembedded disjunction is generaIly 
taken to be an epistemic possibility for the speaker. In fact, if this assumption 
conflicts with other information which the interpreter has, utterance of the disjunction 
may weIl be taken to be defective in some way. 13  Zimmermann caIls this the 
Genuineness constraint. 
We can reformulate the Genuineness constraint in terms of alternatives sets 
generated by a disjunction, as foIlows: 
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(5 1 )  Genuineness constraint 
Let A be an unembedded maximal alternatives set generated by a disjunction 
dl or. .. or dn. Under normal conversational circumstances, all aEA are taken 
to be epistemic possibilities for the speaker. 
The property of being an epistemic possibility for the speaker is thus attributed 
symmetrically to each disjunct. Thus, we can see Genuineness as arising in the 
service of Symmetry: ifno satisfying property is made salient by the truth conditions, 
assume Genuineness in order to satisfy Symmetry. 14 
It is presumably not accidental that Genuineness arises as a requirement only 
when the maximal alternatives set is not embedded under any operator. When it is 
so embedded, Symmetry has to satisfied in some sense relative to that operator. In 
particular, when the maximal alternatives set is embedded directly under a modal 
operator, then the property satisfying Symmetry must be a relation between the 
disjuncts and the relevant set of accessible worlds. The current account remains 
unsatisfactory in that it does not quite capture this dependency between or 
coordinations and the operators which embed them. I hope to remedy this in future 
work. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The proposal made here for the analysis of or coordinations has two parts. The basic 
semantic proposal is contained in the Set Formation analysis laid out in section 1 . 1 .  
According to this analysis, or triggers the construction of a set whose members are 
the denotations of its disjuncts. This set may compose with an argument via 
Independent Composition; or may be simplified by set union, with composition then 
proceeding in the normal way. I have demonstrated that different composition 
strategies allow for the derivation of different readings. In particular, we can account 
in this way for the well known fact that disjunctions can scope either over or under 
an apparently wider scope operator, as illustrated by the ambiguities we have 
considered here. More work needs to be done to ensure that this system does not 
overgenerate. 
But the Set Formation analysis cannot, by itself, account for some ofthe most 
problematic readings of or sentences, in particular, for the free choice readings of 
sentences like (28) and (4 1 )  above. These anomalous readings, I have argued, show 
us the effects of the Symmetry Condition on the use of or coordinations. I have 
claimed that this condition is always in effect, but that in the majority of cases, it is 
straightforwardly satisfied. Free choice readings, which in all cases entail the 
interpretations derivable by the Set Formation analysis, are claimed to arise as a 
result of a process of strengthening motivated by the need to satisfy Symmetry. 
SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF OR 
4. 1 .  Why not a more standard pragmatic approach? 
My analysis of free choice readings concedes that these are not derived by 
straightforward compositional processes. Once this concession is made, one might 
wonder: why not derive them as familiar sorts of conversational imp1icatures? 
Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) adopt this strategy to account for the free choice 
effects associated with indefinites in certain environments. So it might seem natural 
to extend this to the case of or. 
One fundamental reason why I do not adopt this strategy is this :  In the 
interpretations assigned to free choice sentences, the "free choice component" is in 
no way separable from ''what is said." It is not the case, as with other conversational 
implicatures of all kinds, that one can separate what was said, strictly speaking, from 
what was implied or conveyed. As illustration, consider the following scenario.  
Suppose I write on my course syllabus: 
(52) To pass this course, you may write a term paper of20 pages, or three papers 
of 6 pages each. 
Now imagine the following conversation between two of my students: 
(53) The Conversationalist: That's  interesting, the syllabus says there are two 
options for papers for this course. 
The Stickler: Well no, what the syllabus says is  that one of 
those two things is permitted. But I suppose it 
implies that we can do either. 
What The Stickler says does not seem to be justifiable (or even unjustifiable) 
nitpicking; it seems to be false. The syllabus indeed says that there are two options; 
there is no distinct "strict sense" in which the sentence can be taken. If the sentence 
is mistakenly taken disjunctively, then there is no free choice reading at all ;  if it is 
correctly taken as a free choice statement, then there is no "underlying" disjunctive 
reading. 
The lack of a distinction in free choice sentences between a "strict" sense and 
the full communicative value leads me to the conclusion that an analysis along the 
Kratzer and Shimoyama line, which generates non-free-choice truth conditions and 
then adds on the free choice component as a conversational inference, is 
inappropriate here.ls 
4.2. What kind of constraint is Symmetry? 
This brings us to a crucial question: If Symmetry is not conceived as a kind of 
Gricean pragmatic principle, then what kind of principle is it? 
First, the principle, as I currently conceive of it, is conventional, not 
conversational. That is, I understand it as a constraint which is specifically associated 
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with the word or (or perhaps somewhat more generally, with expressions which 
introduce alternatives). I have not attempted to derive the principle from any more 
general properties of conversation, although perhaps such a derivation is possible. I 
suspect that the constraint is violable, although only in special circumstances. 
The closest relative to the Symmetry Condition which I 've encountered in the 
literature is the Homegeneity Constraint, posited by some authors for the 
interpretation of distributive predicates (see Loebner 1 987, Schwarzschild 1 994, 
Beck 200 1) .  This constraint is offered as a defmedness constraint on distributive 
predication, and is formulated by Beck as follows: 
(54) *P(A) = I iff\;.fx[xEA -> P(x)] 
o iff\;.fx[XEA -> �P(x)] 
undefmed otherwise. 
This constraint does not fall out of the semantics of distributivity, but is imposed as 
a condition on admissible truth conditions. There is certainly some informal 
similarity between this condition and my Symmetry condition: both conditions have 
the effect of strengthening truth conditions on the basis of a requirement that every 
member of a relevant set share a given property. 
My utilization of a special principle to strengthen truth conditions is also 
reminiscent of Chierchia's  (2004) treatment of Scalar Implicature. In his proposal, 
these implicatures are calculated locally, in the course of semantic composition, with 
strengthened interpretations being fed back in to the semantic composition process. 
It is clear that once the principle generating scalar implicatures is taken to WOlk in 
this way, it is no longer being understood as a conversational principle in the Gricean 
sense!6 Thus, acceptance of this analysis means accepting that there are processes 
working in tandem with semantic composition which are neither a part of ordinary 
compositional semantics, nor a part of post-semantic pragmatic inferencing. We 
might think of these processes as beingfonctional. They are understandable in terms 
of familiar ideas such as maximizing informativity; but they are not driven by 
expectations of cooperation, as ordinary pragmatic processes are. 
Endnotes 
ITbroughout the paper, I will adopt a simple accessibility semantics for modaIs. 
Nothing hinges on this .  The proposal is compatible with more complex analyses. 
Throughout, ' ACCw.' denotes the set of worlds deontically accessible from w*.  
2This proposal constitutes a deviation from a strict conception of compositionality, 
as it assumes that it is possible to look into the derivational history of the denotation 
of a node. More deviations from strict compositionality will follow. 
31 am assuming without comment that while negation takes scope over may, 
must takes scope over negation. This switch in relative scope occurs independently 
of the interaction with or. Consider sentences (i) and (ii): 
(i) Jane may not sing. 
SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF OR 
(ii) Jane must not sing. 
These both mean the same thing, i.e. that Jane is not pennitted to sing. We can 
represent this only by assuming that the modal and negation switch scopes, as shown 
in (iii) and (iv) . 
(iii) �OJane sing 
(iv) D�Jane sing 
This scope switch is certainly puzzling, and interesting in its own right; but I assume 
it is tangential to the issue of how disjunction interacts with modals. 
4"[Xr' denotes the complement of [X). 
5They are the truth conditions for the sentence "Jane must either not sing or not 
dance," where the negation is clearly phrasal. 
6This is only one of the available interpretations. 
7The different accounts have varying success, however, in deriving correct truth 
conditions for related sentences, including the variant with must. 
8This point is nicely demonstrated by Alonso-Ovalle (2004). 
9That is, on the maximal alternatives set introduced by the coordination. See below. 
IlYfhe very same fundamental idea is also expressed in a much earlier proposal of 
mine concerning disjunction, made in my 1 998 Ph.D. dissertation, published as 
Simons (2000). 
I I I  include the initial conjunct, representing the compositionally derivable truth 
conditions, for perspicuity; but of course this conjunct is redundant, as it is entailed 
by each of the additional conjuncts. 
1 2This reading of the must sentence isn't traditionally called a free choice reading, but 
I think the name is appropriate: the sentence says that Jane is free to choose either 
action to fulfil her obligation. 
J 3But not necessarily. One has to look at the total communicative situation in which 
the utterance is made. 
140ne might speculate that in cases where Genuineness can felicitously be suspended, 
some other salient property is available for the satisfaction of Symmetry. 
I S  Additionally, the particular pragmatic argument provided by Kratzer and 
Shimoyama (2002) for generating the free choice inference is, in my view, 
problematic. However, to argue this point, I would have to rehearse the details of 
their proposal, which would take me beyond the space constraints of this paper. 
1 6This is my own view; I don't know ifChierchia would agree with this. 
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